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Institutions and Economic Growth: A Cross country Evidence  
 
 
The role of institutions in promoting economic growth and development has generated 
considerable interest among researchers and practitioners in recent years. This paper 
explores the role of state institutions in promoting growth using a GMM econometric 
model. Specifically it attempted to test impact of two dimensions of institutions on 
growth using recently developed index of institutionalized social technologies and its 
sub indices namely Risk reducing technologies and Anti rent seeking technologies. The 
result suggests a strong causal link between institutional quality and economic 
performance, and also confirms conditional convergence as predicted in the modern 
theories of growth   
 
 
 
Introduction  
Exploring the relationship between economic performance and the quality of domestic 
institutions has been a major area of interest. The better quality of institutions has a positive 
and significant effect on growth and human development and this effect is more vehement for 
long term growth than short term. The role of regulatory institutional capacity also play 
important role for the cross-country variations in economic growth through positive impact 
on total factor productivity. The causality between institutions and economic performance is 
also important issue and studies shows better institutions leads to a higher income rather than 
causation being in the opposite direction. Some studies find that the quality of governance 
and institutions is important in explaining the higher rates of investment through improving 
the climate for capital creation .Other studies reiterated institutional roles in improving 
international capital flows in particular FDI and portfolio investment. 
There is a rich literature on Solow growth model, extended growth model, endogenous 
growth model and extended endogenous growth model. This literature assumes transmission 
mechanism, distributive policies and institutions, are working properly and income is 
converging to high level. However, in developing countries this assumption is not valid and 
one of the most important reasons for low productivity and skewed income distribution.   
The present study makes an early attempt to test empirically the role of institution on 
economic development. Earlier studies use data bases and indices which cover one or few 
aspects of the institutional capacity.  For this paper we develop a comprehensive index of 
“institutionalized social technologies” which is build on theoretical framework of contract 
and predatory theories set by North (1981). This index is made up of Risk reducing 
technologies based on contract theory and Anti-Rent seeking technologies based on predatory 
theory of state.   
The paper is organised is follow. Section gives introduction, section 2 review the literature, 
section 3 discusses the empirical side of the paper and section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
Review of literature 
North (1990) defines institutions as the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, “the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. These rules of game can be in 
form of formal institutions like laws and regulations or informal ones which assimilated to 
culture Tabellini (2005) or social capital Putnam & at al. (1993). Some institutions lowers 
transaction cost thereby result in innovation and productivity whereas other institutional 
features impedes information flow, raising information costs and eroding the gains from 
information, and limit entrepreneurial activity. Examples of institutions that stunt economic 
growth include government, police and/or court corruption, excessive taxation and/or 
regulation, unstable and/or inconsistent monetary and fiscal policy. (Frye and Shleifer 1997; 
Johnson, Kaufmann, Zoido-Lobaton 1998; Shleifer and Vishney 1993, 1994; Soto 1989, 
2000;  Rodrik at al. 2003, 2004; Easterly and Levine 2002; Kaufmann and Kraay 2002; 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005; Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995; Meon and 
Sekkat 2004; Barro 1997,2000; Sachs and Warner 1995). On distinguishing between kinds of 
institutions, North (1981) proposes two theories, a “contract theory” of the state and a 
“predatory theory” of the state. According to the first theory, the state and associated 
institutions provide the legal framework that enables private contracts to facilitate economic 
transactions hence reducing transaction costs. According to the second, the state is an 
instrument for transferring resources from one group to another. 
Neoclassical growth modelling Solow (1956) predicted economies move toward their steady-
state growth path which means that in the long run, income per capita levels will converge. 
However, lack of empirical support for convergence has presented a major challenge to these 
models. A more refined endogenous growth theory by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) and 
its empirics provides the evidence of „conditional‟‟ convergence, where convergence is 
conditional on factors some of which are related to institutions. This is explained by new 
growth theories as “knowledge spillovers” assumption whereby any sector in less advanced 
countries can catch-up with the current technological frontier whenever it “innovates”. The 
term “innovation” also refers to the adaptation of technologies which in turn depends upon 
the institutional arrangements. As argued by North and Thomas (1973), that far from being 
exogenous, technological changes crucially depend just on the prevailing institutions through 
their impact on incentives and transaction costs: it is these that largely determine how fast, if 
at all, technological changes will actually progress. 
Institutions contributes to growth and development by reducing risk of doing business thus 
preventing diversion of resources and by preventing predatory rent seeking activities thereby 
diverting resource towards innovation.  A society free of diversion, productive units are 
rewarded by the full amount of their production and individual units do not need to invest 
resources in avoiding diversion.  
In particular (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002, 2005) show that quality of institutions have a more 
important effect on long term growth than on short term one. Jalilian et al. (2007) emphasises 
the role of regulatory institutional capacity in accounting for cross-country variations in 
economic growth Méon and Weill (2006) , Olson et al. (1998) find evidence suggesting that 
institutional factors are strongly related to total factor productivity. As productivity growth is 
higher in countries with better institutions and quality of governance.  
 With regards to causal effect  between institutions and economic performance , studies like 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2000; Olson et al. 1998; Rodrik et al. 2004; Kauffman et 
al. 2005, p. 38), indicates indicate that a better institutions leads to a higher income rather 
than causation being in the opposite direction. In particular Kauffman suggests that a one 
standard deviation improvement in governance institutions leads to a two to threefold 
difference in income levels in the long run. 
Some studies find that the quality of governance and institutions is important in explaining 
the rates of investment, as they suggested they effect economic performance through 
improving the climate for capital creation (Kirkpatrick, Parker, & Zhang 2006; World Bank, 
2003). Other studies reiterated institutional roles in improving international capital flows in 
particular FDI (Reisen and De Soto 2001; Smarzynska and Wei 2000). And portfolio 
investment Gelos and Wei (2002) 
 
Empirical Analysis 
The aim of the empirical section of the paper is to investigate links between nations‟ 
institutional quality and economic growth, using GMM instrumental variable estimation 
method in order to control for endogeneity. This subsection describes data, the regression 
specifications and methodology. 
 
Data Description 
The dependent variable is the GDP growth in real term. There are two sets of independent 
variables. First is the institution al variables and send is control variables. For the institutional 
variables we have used recently developed indices by Siddiqui and Ahmed (Unpublished) for 
the measure of institutional quality. The index named „index of institutionalized social 
technology‟, covers 141 countries. This comprehensive index covers wide range of 
institutional performance indicators and employ more than 120 data sources, namely (World 
Economic Forum; Global integrity; Kaufmann at al. 2008; PRS; BERI; Gwartney and 
Lawson 2008; Miller and Holmes 2009; Cingranelli and Rishards;  Djankov at al. 2001; La 
Porta at al. 1999; Lambsdorff; Bertelsmann; Marshall and Keith; Kurtzman and Yago 2009).  
We take index of institutionalized social technology, as well as its sub indices of Risk 
reducing technologies and Anti-rent seeking technologies for measurement of institutional 
quality. This index and its sub indices are build on theoretical framework of contract and 
predatory theories set by North. Specifically sub index of Risk reducing technologies is based 
on contract theory whereas index of Anti-Rent seeking technologies is based on predatory 
theory of state.  
Risk reducing technology removes information asymmetry, creates mutual trust and hence 
decreases the risk of creating long term business relationships. It re-price contravention 
activities through increasing risk of getting caught. This Index is aggregate form of following 
risk reducing Technologies.  1. Contract enforcement and property rights focusing on 
financial and investment rights and contract enforcement. 2. Justice system measuring 
judicial professionalism, independence, efficiency and impartiality and affordability. 3. Law 
enforcement covering focusing on risks pertaining to theft losses, tax evasion, confiscation 
organized crime as well as reliability and professionalism of police and other law 
enforcement services, business costs of crime and violence and torture, extrajudicial killing,  
political imprisonment, and disappearance indicators  and finally the Policy stability that 
focus on executive constraints, military interference in rule of law and the political process 
and stability of democratic institutions.  
Anti-Rent seeking technologies plugs in predatory opportunities that arise due to gaps or 
loopholes in ineffective or week institutions, creating rents for controlling agents betting 
them higher return than though innovation hence is making society moves from innovative to 
rent seeking activities. This index specially focuses on technologies which helps curb the rent 
seeking opportunity arising from institutions, policies and political system. It includes 
following technologies 1. Technologies curbing institutional Rents include regulatory and 
bureaucratic efficiencies, ease in doing business and control of corruption. 2.Policy rents 
curbing technologies includes  competition and market excess, Freedom of businesses from 
Licences, permits and restriction and Price controls, and less numbers of businesses operating 
under shadow economy. And 3. Political Rent curbing technologies measures the extent of 
power given by institutions to political authorities. Specifically, it focuses on political 
Accountability, participation and competitiveness, citizen Rights and Voice. These indices 
are in 0 to 1 ranges where higher values indicating better institutional quality. Dependent and 
control variables such as Real GDP  Growth, Gross domestic savings as % of GDP, Debt as 
% of GNI  and Inflation are taken from World Development Indicators and Global 
Development Finance, World Bank. Public investments as % of GDP is taken from Guy et al. 
(1999). All these variables are expressed in term of averages from 1988 to 2003. Real GDP 
Per Capita in 1960 is taken from Levine and Renelt (1992), while Human development Index 
in taken from UNDP. Table 1 gives detailed information about the variables and their data 
source. 
Despite majority of variables in our index measuring institutions belongs to roughly the same 
time as other control and dependent variable, some might belong to different times. Even then 
its validity can be established as institutional variables rarely change over the years. As 
Kaufmann at al. (2008), indicates these changes are relatively small, and depict considerably 
high correlation between current and lagged estimates. Even if some variable significantly 
change over time, its effect in aggregate index would not be much and would not produce any 
significant effect in our analysis.   
 
Regression Specification   
Our specification is based on combining growth theories such as Solow (1956), Romer 
(1986) and Lucas (1988) with North (1981). Specifically Modern growth theories and their 
empirics provide the evidence of conditional convergence, where convergence is conditional 
on factors some of which are related to institutions. And the role of these institutions in 
economic growth is explained by north in “contract theory” and a “predatory theory” of the 
state. To assess these roles we used standard growth regression framework which mostly 
follow growth empirics literature, such as (Barro 1991; Mankiw et al. 1992; and Leving and 
Renelt 1991).  
Δyi = β0 + β1Ii + β2Xi + єi 
where i is the country  єi is the error term. The economic growth Δyi  is measured by change 
as the  GDP in real terms, Ii stands for institutional variables, whereas Xi is the vector of 
control variables for other determinants of growth.  
Other determinants of growth denoted by Xi include variables to control for other factors that 
influence growth. In most empirical studies, the choices of additional control variables are ad 
hoc across studies.  As one example, the data appendix in Levine and Renelt (1992) lists over 
50 possibilities. In our study, we will be using variables pertaining t, initial conditions, 
macroeconomic stability, human capital, physical capital, savings, Debt and current account 
balance.  
The first control variable describe initial conditions, In new classical growth models, such as 
Solow (1956), a country‟s per capita growth rate tends to be inversely related to initial 
income, which shows poor countries tend to grow faster than rich countries. Thus they tend to 
converge across countries. But studies like Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) proved this 
conversion is conditional upon other economic variables, such as measures of democracy, 
political stability, industry and agriculture shares in countries, rates of investment. To find the 
evidence of convergence, we used Real GDP per capita in 1960. 
Another Factor producing considerable influence on growth is human capital. It fastens the 
process innovation of new goods and technologies, ultimately driving growth and 
productivity, hence it could be positively related to growth. This conclusion is also supported 
by Barro (1991, p.22). In growth empirics education attainment is widely used as a proxy of 
human capital. But in our study secondary school enrolment as a proxy of education 
attainment is highly insignificant. Therefore we dropped this from our model. Also studies 
such as Pritchett (1996) shows improvement in education attainment has no positive effect on 
growth hence could not be a good proxy for human capital. Perhaps a better measure is to 
combine education attainment along with other variables like health to capture the effect of 
human capital collected for the period of 1990 to 2006.   
Macroeconomic stability factor in growth empirics is normally captured by consumer price 
inflation. It is expected that higher inflation tends to reduce growth due to a high level of 
price instability hence could have a negative expected sign. As Kormendi and  Meguire 
(1985) and Grier and Tullock (1989) find that inflation are negatively related to growth.  
To avoid the multicollenarity issue between the saving and investment we have used only 
public investment rather than total investment. Infrastructure investment is good proxy to use 
for public capital stocks. It is believed that public capital stock, especially public 
infrastructure, is an important determinant of the level of investment, in turn, economic 
growth given that public and private capital stocks are complements. As proved in 
endogenous growth models, such as (Rebelo 1990; and Barro 1990), per capita growth and 
investment ratio tend to move together. This variable is captures by public investments as % 
of GDP as supposed to have a positive sign. 
Saving represented by gross domestic saving as % of GDP, is considered a crucial variable of 
growth equation. With positive expected sign, higher saving leads to higher investment which 
in turn leads to higher economic growth. The presumption is that higher saving precedes 
economic growth. In a typical model of economic growth such as the Solow (1956) model, a 
clear connection is made between saving and economic growth. Romer (1987,1989) suggests 
that saving has too large an influence on growth and take this to be evidence for positive  
externalities from capital accumulation. On the empirical fount, (Modigliani 1970, 1990; 
Maddison 1992; and Carroll and Weil 1994) prove robust positive correlation between saving 
and growth.  
Another factor producing considerable impact on economic growth is level of public debt. In 
the traditional neoclassical models, the relation between debt and growth is positive, but this 
link is flawed by the unrealistic assumption of perfect capital mobility. In real term the effect 
of debt on economic growth is negative. This could be due to the so‐called “crowding out” of 
public investment, which states that a larger debt service discourages public investment, since 
it soaks up resources from the government budget and reduces the amount of money available 
for productive investment. Perhaps a large portion of debt consists of external debt. Its effect 
on growth is analysed by studies like (Krugman 1988; and Sachs 1989). They proved the 
hypothesis of Debt overhang meaning that for large debt, the expected interest payments are a 
positive function of output. Thus, investments decrease, because their return will be taxed 
away by foreign creditors, and the pace of economic growth will slow down. Its empirical 
evidence is shown by Pattillo et al. (2002, 2004) show that a large external debt reduces 
economic growth. We used Percent Value of Debt as % of GDP as indicator of public debt 
with negative expected sign in growth equation. 
Lastly to measure the country dependence on international resources and foreign savings, we 
use measure of current account balance as % of GDP. The expected sign is ambiguous as in 
some cases negative current balance the economy is net borrower and may have positive 
impact on growth at least in the short run.  
Among notable variables not captured in our growth model is fiscal policy indicator, which 
proved to be statistically insignificant and have not being included in our regression 
specification. All variables have the average value computed from the available data. Most of 
the variables the data is available for eight years so we have average of eight observation.  
 
Estimation Methodology 
We will be using GMM procedure in our analysis as there might be the problem of 
endogenity that could arise in independent variables specifically in institutional variables, as 
these variables have a strong positive correlation with growth. In literature, depending on the 
context, GMM has been applied to time series, cross-sectional, and panel data. Inevitably, 
GMM builds from earlier work, and its most obvious statistical antecedents are method of 
moments (Pearson, 1893, 1895) and instrumental variables estimation ( Reiersol 1941; 
Sargan 1958; Hansen 1982). The starting point of GMM estimation is a theoretical relation 
that the parameters should satisfy that is to choose the parameter estimates so that the 
theoretical relation is satisfied as “closely” as possible. The GMM is a robust estimator in 
that, unlike maximum likelihood estimation, it does not require information of the exact 
distribution of the disturbances. In fact, many common estimators in econometrics can be 
considered as special cases of GMM. The theoretical relation that the parameters should 
satisfy are usually orthogonality conditions between some (possibly nonlinear) function of 
the parameters  ƒ(θ)  and a set of instrumental variables  zt:  
E (ƒ(θ)’Z) = 0 
Where  θ  are the parameters to be estimated. The GMM estimator selects parameter 
estimates so that the sample correlations between the instruments and the function ƒ are as 
close to zero as possible, as defined by the criterion function: 
J(θ) = (m(θ))’ Am(θ) 
Where  m(θ)= ƒ(θ)’Z  and  A  is a weighting matrix. Any symmetric positive definite matrix 
A will yield a consistent estimate of  q . However, it can be shown that a necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition to obtain an (asymptotically) efficient estimate is to set A  equal to the 
inverse of the covariance matrix of the sample moments  m . 
To apply this methodology, the following equation is estimated by GMM: 
Δyi = β0 + β1Ii + β2Xi + єi 
The instrumental variables for the equation are all explanatory variables. 
 
Estimation Results 
Before looking at estimation results, a cursory look Table 3 provides the correlation 
coefficient matrix for the key variables used in the study. For comparison, we carry out 
Spearmen‟s Rank Correlation focussing on ordinal information as well as Pearson correlation 
focussing on the interval between observations. The simple correlation coefficients between 
the dependent variable, GDP growth represented by GDPG8803, and possible explanatory 
variables as shown in table 3 have the expected signs. The correlation coefficients between 
the indicators of institutional performance and GDP per capita growth have the expected 
positive sign. Inflation sign is negative as expected showing macroeconomic instability 
hampers growth. The signs of savings and debt are also as expected. Showing savings having 
positive relationship whereas Debt having negative relationship with growth. HDI and 
investments also depicted positive signs as expected. Showing investments particularly 
investments in human capital will positively impact growth. Negative sign of correlation 
between initial GDP and growth shows possible sign of catching up of less developed 
countries to the ranks of advanced countries. Whereas positive sign with current account 
balance possibly shows newly growing economies have excess domestic resources and 
surplus funds. The bivariate correlations between inflation and the institutional proxies used 
are negative, supporting the proposition that economies with better institutions are also better 
able to design macroeconomic policies that stabilize the economy and control inflation. 
Institutions have high positive correlations with initial GDP, whereas correlation coefficient 
of initial GDP with other variables showing developed countries generally have higher 
savings and lower public debt, lower HDI growth and higher current account balance. The 
correlations shows countries with better institutions normally have higher savings, lower debt 
and surplus in current account balance.  Interestingly correlation coefficients among 
institutional variables are about 0.97 which is extremely high which shows different 
institutional measures have high common factors on which these measures are dependent. 
From regression perspective this also suggests that, included in the same regression might 
create problem of multicolinearity.  Correlation coefficients of inflation is positive with 
saving and negative with debt showing higher government debt levels compromises monetary 
policy objectives thereby resulting in inflation, whereas higher savings lowers debt and 
lowers inflation. Other correlation shows countries with current account surplus would have 
higher savings, and lower public debt showing surplus funds in economies.  
In our estimation procedure, we employ GMM methodology. The estimation results clearly 
indicate a robust positive impact of institutional variables on growth. In model 1, all variable 
have expected signs and are highly significant. Specifically initial GDP showing expected 
negative sign and significant. This clearly indicates the sign of convergence as proposed in 
growth theories. Negative sign shows countries with lower initial GDP have experience 
higher growth rate and possibility of catching up. In a simulation to investigate the chances of 
unconditional convergence we tested by omitting institutional variable from the equation. The 
result of the equation shows no indication of unconditional convergence as sign for initial 
GDP per capita was negative however but insignificant. This shows institutions performance 
is a possible pre-condition for convergence.   Moreover, overall significance of other 
independent variables also improved as institutional variable is introduced in model. Among 
other variables, inflation measure having expected negative sign and highly significant at 1% 
in all models suggests that unstable macro economic conditions have a negative effect on 
economic growth. Hence pursuing policies of inflation financed growth might not be fruitful 
in long run. Coefficient of savings also remains positive and highly significant at 1% 
throughout, clearly showing saving is instrumental to growth as it increase capital 
accumulation and investments. 
Public investment coefficient also showing significant positive sign showing infrastructure 
investments provide positive externalities thereby increasing productivity and growth. 
Another form of investment which could provide a positive significant long run effect on 
growth is investing in human capital more specifically in education and health. We used HDI 
change as proxy for human capital and found to be statistically significant and positive. This 
indicates investing in human capital would produce a positive impact on growth, as it 
increase workers quality and ultimately increase productivity. With regards to other variables 
the debt variable came out to be negative and highly significant at 1% which shows increase 
in debt will lead to higher debt servicing ex post, hence crowding out public investment. Debt 
servicing could also aggravate inflation and debt situation and both hampering growth. The 
coefficient of current account balance proved to be negative and significant. This might 
suggests countries with higher current account deficits, might enjoy higher growth. This 
negative coefficient could be because current account deficit mean the countries are net 
borrower and their domestic savings are complemented by foreign savings. This could also 
mean investment opportunities in country could be more than what domestic resources could 
finance, thus relying and enjoying foreign capital. The institutional variables‟ coefficients are 
highly significant and positive indicate institutional quality positively and significantly 
influence growth.  In a simulation we included all three indices in one equation. It was 
witnessed, when used individually, they became highly significant, but when used with other 
institutional variables, there significant considerably decreased perhaps because of high 
multicollinearity among these variables. Due to this fact, we used them separately in three 
equations. The three indices separately tested for institutional quality are a composite index 
of institutionalized social technology and two of its sub indices namely index of risk reducing 
technologies and rent seeking technologies. All three are positive and highly significant at 1% 
level; among them rent seeking index causes comparatively larger impact on growth than the 
risk reducing index (5.68 as compared to 4.49 in risk reducing technology). These 
institutional indices are comparable as they all have similar range between 0 and 1. Higher 
coefficients shows they exerts a considerable impact on growth as one point increase in 
institutionalized social technologies will leads to 4.60 percent increase in growth rate in 
model 1. 
 
Conclusion 
The results suggest a strong link between institutional quality and economic growth. All three 
measures of institutional quality significantly and positively affect growth. Moreover our 
analysis  indicate that between the two forms of institutions measured as a sub- indices of 
institutionalized social technologies, Anti-rent seeking technologies impact growth 
considerable more than the risk reducing technologies.   A similar conclusion is reached by 
Acemogu and Johnson (2005) who attempted to distinguish between anti-rent seeking 
institutions and risk-reducing institutions, as they termed them as “property rights” and 
“contracting” institutions respectively. They found strong support for the importance of anti-
rent seeking institutions on economic outcome but In contrast, indicate that the role of risk 
reducing institutions is more limited.  The reason they give to this fact is, in absence of 
formal risk reducing institutions – contracting institutions, the gap is filled by private 
alternative institutional arrangement. Like in earlier times when formal institutions of courts 
and police don‟t exist or ineffective, people then resort to dwell in groups where contracts are 
honoured through informal pressure and risk of expulsion from group. Hence their rights are 
secured in other ways. In contrast, protection from rent seeking behaviour relates to the 
relationship between the state and the citizens. When the state have major problems of 
corruption, inefficiency or no checks on the state, on politicians, and on elites, individuals 
don‟t have a level playing fields and adds to uncertainty. In this case, they are also unable to 
enter into private arrangements to circumvent these problems. The other control variables 
shows macroeconomic stability, human capital, physical capital and current account balance 
have significant impact as predicted by theory. The result also confirms conditional 
convergence as predicted in the modern theories of growth.  
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Table 1 
Data Sources and Description 
 
  Variable Name Description  Concept Measured Source 
1 RGDPPC60 
Real GDP per Capita in 
1960 Initial Factor 
Original Source Summers  
and Heston (1988), Taken 
by Levine and Renelt 
(1992) 
2 GDPG8803 
Average Real GDP 
Growth (% annual)  from 
1988 to 2003 
Macroeconomic 
performance 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
3 INV8898 
Average Public 
investments as % of GDP 
from 1988 to 2003 Infrastructure 
Original Sources: Guy et 
al.(1999),Missing data 
filled in from Easterly et al 
(1994) and Bruno and 
Easterly (1998)  
Taken from: Global 
Development Network 
Growth Database. 
4 SAV8803 
Average Gross domestic 
savings as % of GDP 
from 1988 to 2003 Savings 
World Development 
Indicators (various years), 
World Bank 
5 DEBT8803 
Average Present Value of 
Debt as % of GNI from 
1988 to 2003 Debt 
Global Development 
Finance and  World 
Development Indicators 
(various years), World 
Bank 
6 INF8803 
Average Inflation, 
consumer prices (annual 
%) from 1988 to 2003 
Macroeconomic 
Stability 
World Development 
Indicators (various years), 
World Bank 
7 HDIG9006 
Change in Human 
Development Index from 
1990 to 2006 Human Capital 
human development 
report (various years), 
UNDP 
8 CABAL8806 
Average Current Account 
Balance as % of GDP 
from 1988 to 2006 
International 
Competitiveness 
World Economic Outlook 
(various years), IMF 
9 Sci_agg  
Index Institutionalized 
Social Technologies Institutions 
Siddiqui and Ahmed 
(unpublished) 
10 Sii_agg 
Aggregate Index of Risk 
reducing Technologies Institutions 
Siddiqui and Ahmed 
(unpublished) 
11 Ri 
Index of AntiRent seeking 
Technologies Institutions 
Siddiqui and Ahmed 
(unpublished) 
 
  
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable Name No. of Obs Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
sci 141 0.056305 0.933607 0.559089 0.190408 
Ri 141 0.057805 0.929479 0.563807 0.192067 
Sii 141 0.014987 0.937735 0.554371 0.194626 
RGDPPC60 101 0.208 7.38 1.922228 1.798871 
INV8898 75 2.311768 20.96169 7.405532 3.81441 
SAV8803 135 -21.8591 46.89647 18.24691 10.91243 
DEBT8803 95 7.294784 566.9779 68.13708 68.07221 
INF8803 130 0.372221 2318.589 84.06305 278.3342 
HDI9006 94 -0.028 0.156 0.065521 0.037294 
GDPG8803 132 -4.08656 9.099684 2.800371 2.192411 
CABAL8806 137 -22.3241 48.34026 -1.86556 7.334458 
 
  
Table 3 
Pearson Correlations 
 
   Sci Ri Sii 
RGDP 
PC60 
INV 
8898 
SAV 
8803 
DEBT 
8803 INF8803 HDI9006 
GDPG 
8803 
CABAL 
8806 
Sci Coef. 1 .985(**) .985(**) .708(**) 0.097 .398(**) -.330(**) -.250(**) -.275(**) 0.109 .227(**) 
 
N 141 141 141 101 75 135 95 130 94 132 137 
Ri Coef. 
 
1 .940(**) .716(**) 0.046 .369(**) -.331(**) -.244(**) -.289(**) 0.072 .172(*) 
 
N 
 
141 141 101 75 135 95 130 94 132 137 
Sii Coef. 
  
1 .684(**) 0.14 .414(**) -.303(**) -.248(**) -.254(*) 0.14 .273(**) 
 
N 
  
141 101 75 135 95 130 94 132 137 
RGDPPC60 Coef. 
   
1 -0.164 .368(**) -0.188 -0.106 -.388(**) -0.136 .371(**) 
 
N 
   
101 66 97 67 96 72 97 98 
INV8898 Coef. 
    
1 -0.002 -0.024 -0.047 .288(*) .245(*) -0.219 
 
N 
    
75 74 71 73 52 75 75 
SAV8803 Coef. 
     
1 -0.081 -0.156 -0.09 .210(*) .678(**) 
 
N 
     
135 94 129 92 130 133 
DEBT8803 Coef. 
      
1 .283(**) -0.067 -.284(**) -.353(**) 
 
N 
      
95 91 62 95 95 
INF8803 Coef. 
       
1 -0.052 -.363(**) -.259(**) 
 
N 
       
130 91 127 130 
HDI9006 Coef. 
        
1 .499(**) -0.106 
 
N 
        
94 92 94 
GDPG8803 Coef. 
         
1 .256(**) 
 
N 
         
132 132 
CABAL8806 Coef. 
          
1 
 
N 
          
137 
**. Corr. is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Corr. is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Spearman's rho Correlations 
 
 
 
  Sci Ri Sii 
RGDPP
C60 
INV88
98 SAV8803 
DEBT880
3 INF8803 HDI9006 
GDPG88
03 
CABAL8
806 
Sci Coef. 1 .975(**) .974(**) .694(**) 0.147 .421(**) -0.117 -.472(**) -.359(**) 0.049 .276(**) 
 
N 141 141 141 101 75 135 95 130 94 132 137 
Ri Coef. 
 
1 .906(**) .725(**) 0.067 .400(**) -0.111 -.401(**) -.358(**) 0.006 .247(**) 
 
N 
 
141 141 101 75 135 95 130 94 132 137 
Sii Coef. 
  
1 .630(**) .231(*) .422(**) -0.151 -.533(**) -.352(**) 0.09 .284(**) 
 
N 
  
141 101 75 135 95 130 94 132 137 
RGDPPC60 Coef. 
   
1 -0.171 .495(**) -0.101 -.370(**) -.474(**) -0.181 .436(**) 
 
N 
   
101 66 97 67 96 72 97 98 
INV8898 Coef. 
    
1 0.006 -0.073 0.02 .307(*) .231(*) 0.003 
 
N 
    
75 74 71 73 52 75 75 
SAV8803 Coef. 
     
1 -0.049 -.387(**) -0.15 0.129 .662(**) 
 
N 
     
135 94 129 92 130 133 
DEBT8803 Coef. 
      
1 0.091 -0.207 -.266(**) -.329(**) 
 
N 
      
95 91 62 95 95 
INF8803 Coef. 
       
1 0.036 -.385(**) -.399(**) 
 
N 
       
130 91 127 130 
HDI9006 Coef. 
        
1 .543(**) -0.091 
 
N 
        
94 92 94 
GDPG8803 Coef. 
         
1 .286(**) 
 
N 
         
132 132 
CABAL8806 Coef. 
          
1 
 
N 
          
137 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).                               
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).                 
 
 Table 4 
Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: GDPG8803 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
C -1.180128 -1.446526 -0.687366 
  -0.872367 -1.078961 -0.501575 
SAV8803 0.097844 0.094638 0.105127 
  (3.972231)*** (4.06962)*** (4.043)*** 
INF8803 -0.002735 -0.002947 -0.002634 
  (-5.078299)*** (-5.581566)*** (-4.862613)*** 
RGCPPC60 -0.416075 -0.499724 -0.332119 
  (-2.743166)*** (-3.091731)*** (-2.138038)** 
DEBT8803 -0.013916 -0.013525 -0.015007 
  (-3.891616)*** (-3.953439)*** (-4.316956)*** 
HDI9006 9.657371 9.637402 9.871756 
  (2.617727)** (2.344262)** (2.928749)*** 
INV8898 0.09075 0.103993 0.076572 
  (2.194805)** (2.423554)** (1.89077)* 
CABAL8806 -0.184247 -0.15961 -0.216275 
  (-2.905519)*** (-2.550105)** (-3.27437)*** 
SCI 5.281233 
    (2.999155)***   
RI 
 
5.806273 
    (3.047066)***  
SII 
  
4.123679 
    (2.713007)** 
R-squared 0.670971 0.679838 0.653061 
Adjusted R-squared 0.593552 0.604506 0.571429 
S.E. of regression 1.066646 1.052175 1.095291 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.335396 2.2799 2.264863 
Sum squared resid 38.68296 37.64047 40.78849 
J-statistic 4E-30 2.66E-30 5.53E-30 
*** = Significant at the 1%  level. 
** = Significant at the 5%  level. 
*  = Significant at the 10% level. 
Instrument list: All Independent Variables 
Included observations: 43 after adjustments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 5 
List of Countries included in Regression 
 
 
ALGERIA, ARGENTINA, BANGLADESH, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, CHILE, COLOMBIA, CONGO, COSTA 
RICA, COTE D'IVOIRE, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, EGYPT, EL SALVADOR, 
GUATEMALA , GUINEA-BISSAU, HAITI, INDIA, INDONESIA, IRAN, MALAWI, MALAYSIA, MEXICO, 
MOROCCO, MOZAMBIQUE, NIGERIA, PAKISTAN, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PERU, PHILIPPINES, 
SENEGAL, SOUTH AFRICA, SRI LANKA, TANZANIA, THAILAND, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, 
TUNISIA, TURKEY, UGANDA, URUGUAY,VENEZUELA, ZAMBIA 
  
